SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS-PERFECTING TITLE AFTER SUIT HAS
BEGUN."
As a general rule it is correct to say that if, in a suit for
the performance of a contract of sale, the plaintiff vendor
can make a good title at the time of the decree, it is not
necessary that he should show that his title was good when
he entered into the contract of sale, or even when he brought
his bill. It has been argued that this practice is contrary to
the idea that the remedy of specific performance must be
mutual. If the vendor's title is imperfect or does not exist
at the time he brought his bill, and there was no way in
which he could have been forced to perfect it, the vendee
could not have succeeded in obtaining a decree against the
vendor. The courts in reply to this argument have con
tented themselves with the statement that the rule, requiring the remedy of specific performance to be mutual,
merely means, that the remedy must be mutual at the time
of the decree. The fact is that for over a hundred years
before the rule requiring mutuality in the remedy was
distinctly announced, the practice of allowing a plaintiff
vendor to pelfect his title after bill brought was of - constant occurrence. The doctrine of the necessity for mutuality in the remedy may have been said to have been born
with the exception, or rather necessary limitation, that the
remedy need only be mutual at the time of the decree.- It is
the object of this paper to trace the origin and present limits
of the practice of permitting the plaintiff in a suit to enforce
a purchase to perfect his title after filing his bill.
The earliest reported English case is Langford v. Pitt.'
There B. contracted to purchase land from A., the title to be
conveyed on or before Lady-day. No conveyance was
'Previous papers on the specific performance of contracts and the
defence of want of mutuality, with which this paper is connected, will
be found in 49 A. L. R., pp. 270, 382, 445, 507, 5og, and Vol. so, pp.

65, 251, 329.
22 P. Wins., 629, 1731.
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made on Lady-day. B. died. A. brought specific performance against his executors and heirs. The defendant argued
that by the plaintiff's own showing it appeared that he had
not at the time of entering into the articles a good title. To
this the court replied: "It is sufficient if the party entering
into articles to sell has a good title at the time of the decree,
the direction of the court being in all these cases to inquire
whether the seller can, not whether he could make a title at
the time of executing the agreement. 3

.

.

.

It would be

attended with great inconveniences, were decrees to direct
an inquiry, whether the contractor to sell had at the time of
entering into such contract a title; for thus all incumbrances
and defects must be raked into." 4 The real origin of the rule
is here indicated. The complicated state of English land
titles made it impossible for anyone to know if he had a
perfect title. Therefore, to have refused to enforce a contract merely because there had existed defects in the title,
even if those defects were known to the vendor, would
have been, not only unjtist, but would have practically prohibited contracts for the sale of land. Had it not been for
this fact we would probably have had in Langford v. Pitt a
discussion of the propriety of allowing a man to contract for
the sale of that which he did not own,5 followed by an examination of the apparent delay of the plaintiff in not making a
good conveyance on Lady-day. As to this delay, the state of
English land titles which made it necessary to allow a plaintiff to perfect his title after bill brought, made it inequitable
for the court to insist that the vendor should offer a good
'P. 630. The court refers to an earlier case, Stourton v. Meer-Y, in
which a plaintiff vendor, apparently not having a good title at the time
the suit was brought, was given time to obtain an Act of Parliament
to perfect his title.

" 'b, 631.
'Indeed the next year we have the court reported as saying, in
Tendring v. London, 3 Eq. Cas. Abr. 68o, pl. 9, 1732: "If A. contracts
for the purchase of an estate, and is not absolute owner of it, nor has
it in his power by the ordinary course of law or equity to make himself so, though the owner offers to make a good title, yet equity will not
force the buyer to take it, for every seller that will have such a bargain
executed must be bona fide a contractor." For a possible reconciliation
of this language with the actual practice of .the court as indicated by
Langford v. Pitt, see infra, note 2a.
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title on the exact day mentioned in the contract. At the
time Langford v. Pitt was decided, in sales of real property,
the court practically refused to listen to a defendant vendee
who resisted performance on the ground of the laches of the
plaintiff. 6
There are no other reported cases in the eighteenth century discussing the practice of allowing a plaintiff to perfect
his title after bill brought, though it would appear to be unquestioned that the practice was of daily occurrence. I In
the latter part of the century there was a decided reaction
against allowing a plaintiff, who had apparently contracted
to give a good title on a particular day, having a specific
performance irrespective of the time when he offered a good
title.7 There also existed the more or less indefinite idea
that a contract to be enforced in equity must be reciprocal
or mutual." As a consequence we have in the defendant's
counsel in Wynn v. Morgan,9 a case occurring in 18o2 objecting to the practice. The plaintiff had agreed to sell an estate in fee, conveyance to be made on January I. The purchaser refused to take on the ground that the vendor had
not a fee, but only a term for I,OOO years. The plaintiff
brought his bill for specific performance, and after the bill
was filed, procured an Act of Parliament vesting in him the
fee simple. Sir Samuel Romilly and a Mr. Stanley, for the
defendant, argued that "The court will not carry into execu-.
tion an agreement that is not reciprocal. The defendant was
ready with his money, but the plaintiff had not a title, when
he contracted to sell;'1 and further that the defendant could

not be compelled now to accept the title, "consistently with
the late authorities, holding the performance of contracts to
greater strictness, and considering the time material." Sir
'Vernon v. Stephens, 2 P. Win. 66, 1722; Gibson v. Patterson, i
Atk. 12, 1737.
" Compare Lloyd v. Collett, 4 Bro. C. C. 469, 1793, with the earlier
case of Gregson v. Riddle, 1783, given by Sir Samuel Romilly in his
argument in Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves.,p. 268.
'Bromley'v. Jefferies, 2 Vernon, 415, i7OO, and cases cited in the
first paper on want of mutuality as a defence to a bill for specific performance, 49 A. L. R., 270.
7 Ves. 202, 1802.
" P. 204.
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William Grant, however, ignores the argument that the obligation of the parties was not reciprocal. As to time, he
considers it "unnecessary to determine generally, whether a
plaintiff can at any distance of time come to this court and
say, he is now ready to make a title
." But he points
out that it is in the experience of all "that it has [often] been
absolutely necessary for the party insisting upon the contract
to do something to enable himself to convey a completely
good title,"'" yet specific performance has always been given.
Lord Eldon, in Coffin v. Cooper,'2 refused relief to a purchaser who moved to be discharged from his obligation to
take certain land, the vendee having procured an Act of Parliament perfecting his title after the master had reported that
his title was bad.' 8 That Lord Eldon had some doubts as to
the wisdom of the practice may be inferred from his language in Lechmere v. Brasier,14 where he said: "I will
not extend the rule which the court has adopted, of compelling a purchaser to take the estate where a title is not
made till after the contract, to any case to which it has not
5
already been applied."'
"P. 205.

14 Ves. 2o5, 18o7.

18o2,

In an earlier case, Jenkins v. Hiles, 6 Ves. 646,

655, in admitting the existence of the practice, Lord Eldon said:

"It is impossible to deny, that upon the old authorities a specific performance might be obtained, if the title could be made good before the
report." See also page 154.
The case of Birch v. Haynes, 2 Meriv. 444, decided by Lord Eldon
in 1817, practically decides that a plaintiff who had no title at the time
the bill is filed must pay costs.
14 2 J. & W. 287, 1821, 289. The case was an application on the part of

a purchaser to be discharged from his contract. The vendor at the time
of the contract and also at the time of Lord Eldon's opinion not being
able to make a good title, the purchaser was discharged.
'The

case of Dalby v. Pullen, i RL. & M. 296 i83o, before Lord

Lyndhurst, may be considered an alplication of the language quoted.
A. agreed to sell to B. B. made objections to the title. These were
cleared, and the master reported the title good. The purchase money
was paid into court, and B. took possession. Before conveyance B.
learned, what had all along been known to A.'s agent, namely, that

there was a serious objection to the title. B. obtained a rule to report
the title back to the master, and on re-examination the master reported
adversely on the title. A. took exceptions to this report, and before
argument obtained a good title. The court refused to grant specific
performance and ordered the purchase money returned - 'D
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At the time of the decision in Wynn v. Morgan, though
as stated there had been a reaction against'the refusal to
regard time in contracts for the sale of real property as of
any importance, it was still doubtful whether it was possible
for the parties to a contract for a sale of land to stipulate
that the contract would be at an end if a good title was not
convey ed on a particular day.' 6 Lord Eldon, however, subsequently firmly established the principle that the parties by
express agreement could make the completion of the title by
a particular day essential to the plaintiff's right to specific
performance. 17 This position has since been generally admitted. To use Lord Eldon's expression, "time may 'be of
the essence of the contract." Where it is, and the plaintiff
has not offered a good title on the day stipulated, he cannot
of course perfect his title after bringing his bill; not because
of any objection to that practice, but because he has failed
to perform an antecedent condition to the defendant's obligation to take. I Had Lord Eldon not only recognized the
theoretic right if the parties in a contract for the sale of
real property to make an exact time of conveyance an element of the contract, but had he also been inclined to interpret the contracts which came before him as containing such
provisions, the practice of permitting plaintiffs to perfect
titles after bill brought would have soon practically disappeared. But the confusion in titles to real property, which
had been the origin of the practice, still persisted, and
though as stated, Lord Eldon repeatedly proclaimed that
the parties could make time essential, practically he never
held in any case of the sale of a fee that time was essential.
Indeed he went so far in one case as to hold, that a contract containing a provision that the land should be conveyanced on a particular day, did not contain a single word
making the offer of a good conveyance on that day essential
to the vendor's right to a specific performance.' 8 Practically,
therefore, while the position of Lord Eldon in recognizing
" See statement of Lord Eldon in Boehrn v. Wood, I 1. & W. 4T9,

1820, 420.

'Levy 'v. Lindo, 3 Meriv. 8i, 1817, 84; Boehom v. Wood, I J. &
419, 182o, 420; Withy v. Cottle, T. & R. 78, 1823, 79.
Boehm v. Wood, I J. & W. 419, I82o.
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the right of the parties to contract for a conveyance on a
particular day or n6t at all, contained.the possibility of a
decided curtailment of the practice of permitting the plaintiff
to perfect his title after bill brought, the practice was probably as general during Lord Eldon's time as it had been in
the eighteenth century.
The idea that the remedy of specific performance must
be mutual was first definitely adopted by the English court
in 1828.19 In 1842 we have two reported cases, Eyston
v. Simonds2" and Salisbury v. Hatcher,21 in which the
'plaintiff sought to enforce a contract to purchase land.
though at the time of the contract he had not a 'good title.
In both cases the defence of want of mutuality is raised.
In the first case Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce does not
notice the defence, and in the second he merely points to the
fact that mutuality at the time the bill is filed has not heretofore been required. 22 As far as the writer is aware the
arguments in these cases are the only attempts in England
to introduce the present idea in respect to the necessity for
mutuality in the remedy of specific performance, as a reason
for requiring the seller to have a good title at the time of
23
the contract.
In none of the cases we have discussed do the facts reported warrant the assumption that the plaintiff when he
contracted to sell had absolutely no title. None of them
have the earmarks of a mere speculation on the plaintiff's
part. The decisions reflect the feeling that he who sells
an estate to which he believes he has a title, should have
time to perfect that title. It is therefore pertinent to inquire, if the same relief would be given in a case where at
the time of the contract the plaintiff has no shadow of a
claim on the land he sells. The language in the case of
Tendring v. London2 4 indicates that the court in the first
half of the eighteenth century would have tended to give
See supra, note 6.

101 Y. & C. C. C. 6o8, 1842.
22
Y. & C. C. C. 54, 1842.
2P. 63.
' For a case in the United States; see infia, note 50.
"3 Eq. Cas. Abr. 68o, pl. 9, 1732, quoted in full supra, note 5.
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a negative answer to this question. Lord*Eldon, while he
evidently thinks specific performance should not be given in
such a case, is of the opinion that there is no doubt but that
it was in his day too late for the court to take the position'
that a specific performance could be refused. 25 The next reported case is Hoggart v. Scott.26 There certain persons,
thinking themselves trustees of an estate, agreed to sell part
'Lord
Eldon points 'out that: "There is a difference between an
estate subject to encumbrances, and the case I put, where the vendor
at the date of the contract has not a title." But he has immediately preceded this sentence by the observation that '. .
if a person carries
an estate to market, not having any title at the time, it is much too late
to discuss the question, whether it would have been wholesome originally to have held that he should not have a specific performance."
Mortlock v. Buller, io yes. 18o4, p. 315. Years afterwards in Boehm v.
Wood, I J. & W. 419, 182o, 421, he confirms this opinion, saying "I
admit, however, that if A. B. undertakes to sell another's estate, it does
not signify whether A. B. has any interest, provided he can give the
estate at theFtime the purchaser was to have it."
Sudgen, in hi's work on Vendors and Purchasers, follows the earlier
case of Tendring v. London, 3 Eq. Cas. Abr. 68o, pl. 9, 1732. He says:
"Where a person takes upon himself to contract for the sale of an
estate, and is not absolute owner of it, nor has it in his power by the
ordinary course of law or equity to make himself so, though 'the owne'
offer to make the seller a title, yet equity will not force the buyer to
take it, for every seller ought to be a bona fide contractor; and it would
lead to infinite mischief if one man were permitted to speculate upon
the sale of another's &state." Vol. r, p. 2o7, ninth ed. He also brings
in the idea of mutuality which would apply to any perfecting of title
after contract, and not merely to the case where there was no title in
the 'vendof at the time of the contract. He says: "Besides, the remedy
is not mutual, which, perhaps, is, of itself, a sufficient objection in a case
of this nature."
The courts of common law were also discussing a similar question.
In 1826 Lord Chief Justice Abbott, in IBryan v. Lewis, Ry. & Moo. 386,
held that a contract to sell that which the vendor must go into the
market to buy amounted to a wager on the price of the commodity.
This position was soon repudiated: See Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 5
M. & W. 462, 1839, where Baron Parke said that he could not see
"what principle of law is at all affected by a man's being allowed to
contract for the sale of goods, of which he has not possession at the
time of the bargain, and has no reasonable expectation of receiving."
In Mqilo!ner v. M'Callan, 6 M. & W. 58, 184O, 76, Baron Alderson
places the refusal to follow Bryan v. Lewis on the ground that "it
would put an end to half the commercial contracts in London."
1 R. & M. 293, 183o.
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to the defendant. On discovering their error the vendors
notified the defendant,- telling him that they would at once
take steps to acquire a title: The ofily action taken by
the defendant was to urge the vendors to complete their title.
Subsequently the defendant repudiated the contract because
of the delay. Sir John Leach, -inthe course of his opinion,
points out that: "The defendant, if he had thought fit, might
hav'e declined the contract as soon as he discovered that the
plaintiffs had no title.

'2 7

The inference from this is, that

if the vendor has no title at the time of the contract, the
vendee, discovering the fact, can terminate the contract, in
which event the vendor would be denied relief because there
was no longer any contract between the parties. A few
years later Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, speaking on the same
general subject, introduces the thought that the knowledge
of the vendor at the time of the contract that he has no title
is an element to be taken into consideration. "r admit," he
said, "if the case is that A., with reference to an estate
which he knows to belong to B., contracts to sell to C., that
it is a very wholesome rule that this court ought not to aid
such a contract.

' 28

In the case of Forrerv. Nash,2 9 Sir

John Romilly refused to give specific performance, where
the plaintiff agreed to sell a lease which he knew he had no
power to assign. The defendant on learnin the fact had
refused to proceed. At the time the bill was filed the
plaintiff had obtained the right to make the assignment.
Mr. Justice Kekewich, in Wylson v. Dunn,30 expresses
the opinion that, "If a man contracts to sell an agreement
for a lease, and it turns out that he has not got an agreement for a lease, the purchaser, when he finds that to be so,
may say, 'I will not enter into it; I am not repudiating the
contract, for I never entered into it; I am entitled to be off
and I am off.'" This is the last exptession of the English
courts that the writer has been able to find. 1 It would appear
Specific performance was given. '

Chamberlainv. Lee, IOSim. 444, 1840,
Beav. i67, 1865.

450.

235

' L. R. 34 Ch. D. 569, 1887, 577. The question was not involved in
the decision.
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that in England at the present time a court of equity will
discharge a purchaser wirho, believing that he is buying from
a person having a good titlp, finds that his vendor has been
selling that which he had no claim upon.
In order that the right of the vendee to terminate the contract may not be doubtful two things must concur: at the
time of the contract the vend must have had no title, and
this fact though known to him, he must have concealed from,
the vendVA
Thus,, Vice-Chancellor Shadwell himself in
v.
Chamberlain Lee did not dismiss the plaintiff's bill, though
there was a total failure of title to a small portion of the estate sold. The vendor was ignorant of the defect, and he.was
given an opportunity to make by purchase a title to it. Shadwell's successor, Knight-Bruce, admitted that it was doubtful
whether the purchaser of an estate, finding that a material
fact relating to the title had been concealed from him, could
not declare the. contract at an end.31 Eighteen years later
the same judge in Murrell v. Goodyear,3 2 again refuses to
give a positive opinion as to the right of the vendee, on learning of defects in the vendor's title, to terminate the contract.
Thus it is doubtful whether in England the vendee may
terminate the contract, where the vendee finds there is a very
serious defect in the vendor's title, though not a total'absence
oftitle, even though this defect was known to the vendor at
the time of the contract. As stated, when the vendee can
terminate the contract, it is of course impossible for the
vendor to perfect his title after he has brought his bill.
In all cases so far discussed the defects in the vendor's
title were not known to the vendee at the time of the sale.
Where the defect in'the vendor's title is known to the vehdee
at the time of the contract, and the vendor promises to convey a good title, it would appear necessary to allow him a
reasonable time to do so. It would also appear to follow
that the title could be perfected after bill brought. In England this was assumed in Murrell v. Goodyear,3 where in a
'Eyston v. Simonds, i Y. & C. C. C .6o8, 1842, 613 (in this case the
parties continued the negotiation concerning the title); Salisbury v.
Hatcher, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 54, 1842, 65 (here again the discussion con-

cerning the title continued after notice of the defect).
formance was granted in both cases.
2I De G. F. & J. 432, i86o, 446.
" See note 32 supra.
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contract for the sale of real property therewas a clause, which
provided that if the purchaser had any objections to the title.
he should make the same within a specified time after the delivery of the abstract of title. 4 The court held that such clause
presupposed a possibility of defects in title, and such defects
appearing the vendee could not terminate the contract, but
must allow the vendor a reasomble time to perfect his title.'6
When the vendee knows of the defect and the vendor only
promises to convey such title as he has, any qtvstion inSvolved in perfecting the title cannot arise. Where the
vendor merely promises to convey a good title provided he
can secure one, it would appear that the vendee has a right
to terminate the contract at any time before the vendor
secures a good title.8 6 In this case the vendor would apparently have to complete his title before bringing the bill, else
during the pendency of the suit the defendant would have
the right to terminate the contract. The real difficulty in
those cases where the vendee knows of the defect in his
vendor's title at the time-of the contract, is to determine the
exact meaning of the contract between the parties, that is
whether the sale is of such title as the vendor has, or of a
good title, or whether it is merely an agreement to sell provided a good title can be obtained. The question of the
proper interpretation of such contracts
I have discussed at
37
length in a note to a previous paper.
In the United States as early as 18o9, Chief Justice Marshall assumed that a court of equity would grant specific performance to a vendor if he could perfect his title before de"In England it is usual to insert such a clause.

The question what is a reasonable time to perfect title in these cases
the writer hopes to discuss in a subsequent article. Of course, if an
exact day for the completion of the conveyance has been made an element of importance by express words, the fact that the defect may be
cured in a short time does not enable the vendor, who has not conveyed
on the day, to obtain relief. This question will also be discussed in a
subsequent paper.
"Wylson v. Dunn, L. R. 34 Ch. D. 569, 1887, 578. The court, per
Kekewick, here says: "If in the meahtime the vendor had incurred
expense, it may be that he would have a right of action against the
purchaser for his expenditure.!
' See June number, supra, 5o A. L. R. 336, note ig.
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cree.38 The same assumption has been repeatedly made since. 9 ,
Even encumbrances existing at the time of the decree do nov.
prevent specific performance, provided they can be satisfied
out of the purchase money. 40 In the United States, how- ever, the idea that the real question to be decided in a case
where the vendor has not a good title at the time of the contract, is the effect of the delay, if any, on the rights and
obligations of the parties, is stated much more clearly than
in England. In New York as early as i835, the court said:
"A specific performance may be decreed, if it appears by
the report of a master that a perfect title can be made to the
purchaser at the time of making such report, unless the
purchaser has been materially injured by the delay." 41 So
also in More v. Smedburg,4 the vendor had not a
good title at the time of the contract, the vendee tried to
repudiate, and the court assumed that the only question
to be decided, the vendor being then able to make a good
title, was whether an exact day of conveyance was provided
by the contract, and, if not, what was a reasonable time for
the vendor to complete his contract. 43 The same idea has
been advanced in other states.a
'-Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cr. 262, 277, i8og. The case went against the
plaintiff because of imperfection in his title still existing. In a subsequent litigation arising out of the same transaction, it was held that a
vendor, whose bill for specific performance had been dismissed because
of the condition of his title, could not perfect his title and then force the
vendee to take. See Helpurn v. Dunlap, i Wh. 179, 1816, x85, 195, per
Washington, J.
"Watts v. Waddle, 31 U. S.389, 1832, 399; Brown v. Haff, 5 Paige,
235, N. Y. 1835, 241, dicta; Baldwin v. Salter, 8 Paige, 473, 184o, 474,
dicta; Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo. 395, I866, 395; Jenkins v. Fahey,
73 N. Y. 355, 1878, 359; Logan v. Bull, 78 Ky. 607, i88o, 617; Oakey v.
Cook, 41 N. J. Eq. 350, 1886, 364.
"Guild v. Railroad, 57 Kan. 7o, 1896, 76, 77, and cases there" cited.
'Per Chancellor Waiworth in The Reformed Dutch. Church v.
Mott, 7 Paige, 77, 85, 1838.
" 8 Paige, 6oa, N. Y. 1841.
"Specific lperformance was granted.
"In Maryland, in Buchanan v. Lorman, 3 Gill. 5!, i845, 77, Chief
Justice Archer said: "The ability of the vendor (to make a good title)
should exist, when his duty by the contract arises to convey, or at the
time of a decree for a conveyance, where time is not of the essence of
the contract"' Cited with approval and at length in Dorsey v. Hobbs,
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In Massachusetts the question was for a time open to
doubt. In Richmond v. Gray,45 there was a contract for the
sale of land dated the twenty-fifth of June, 1859. No exact
day was mentioned for the conveyance. The vendee took
possession, but in September relinquished possession, and
gave notice of the termination of the contract, because of defects in the vendor's title. In the following April the vendor
perfected his title, and on June 12 brought a bill for specific
performance. The court held that time was material, that
the plaintiff had not perfected his title within a propef time,
and therefore the rule permitting a plaintiff to perfect his
title after bill brought did not apply.46 The rule, that where
time is not material the title can be perfected after bill
brought, is acknowledged; but Judge Chapman, who wrote
the opinion, treats it as an anomaly, saying that, "It amounts
to this: that a party who commences a suit with no existing
cause of action may acquire a claim to a decree by the delay
of the cause in court. And there is danger that it may
amount to making a conitract for the parties into which they
never entered.

'4 7

A few years later the same court in

assuming that specific performance would in no case be
given if the vendor was not the owner at the time of the
sale,48 copied the language of Tendring v. London.49 These
apparent doubts in regard to the whole practice of granting specific performance, where the vendor had to perfect
io Md. 412, 1857, 417, 418, and also in Foley v. Crow, 37 Md. 51, 1872,
59, 6o. See also Maryland Construction Co. v. Kuper, 45 A. 197, Md.
19OO.

In Westall v. Austin, 5 Ir. Eq. i N. C. 1847, 3, 4, there is a dictum
by judge Nash to the effect that it is the privilege of the vendor to
complete his title, and this he may do at any time before decree, provided ther& has been no unnecessary delay.
"85 Mass. 25, 1861.
See especially page 29.
Page 29. He further assumes that since Harringtonv. Wheeler, a

case decided in England in 1799 (see 4 Vesey, 686), time in contracts
for the sale of real property is usually regarded as material. That this
was an error I have indicated supra, note 16, and hope to show at length
in a subsequent paper.
Dicta per Foster, J., in Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545, 1868, 547.
3 Eq. Cas. Abr. 68o, 1732, supra, note 8.
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his title after the contract, led Judge Wells in Dresel v.
Jordan,5 0 to make a rather careful examination of the
whole subject. The plaintiffs, in the case before the court,
had not a perfect title at the time of the contract, but their
title was good befoie the defendant was ready to receive it.
Specific performance was granted, and the language in
Hurley v. Brown expressly repudiated. 51
Judge Wells
expressed the point.of view of the American cases when he
said: "The equitable rule is established .by numerous authorities, that where time is not the essence of the contract, and
is not made material by the offer to fulfill by the other party,
and request for a conveyance, the seller will be allowed reasonable time and opportunity to perfect his title, however
defective it may have been at the time of the agreement.
And in all cases it is sufficient for the seller, upon a contract
made in good- faith, if he is able to make the stipulated title
at the time when, by the terms of his agreement, or by the
equities of the particular case, he is required to make the
conveyance, in order to entitle himself to the consideration."152 He also brushes aside the argument that where the
title is not good at the time of the contract there is a lack of
mutuality. 5
It will be noticed that the presumption from the language
just quoted, is that the vendor need not have a shadow of a
title at the time of the contract. I have been unable to find
American cases discussing the question of the right of the
vendee to terminate the contract if he finds his vendor has
no title.54 Where the vendee at the time of the contract
knows of the imperfect state of vendor's title, and the vendor is assumed to agree to convey a good title, he has, as
W

104 Mass. 407,

'1

See page 414.
Pages 415, 416.

i870.

"Page 414. This is the only case in which want of mutuality is
raised as a defence. Even here, want of mutuality -in the obligation,
rather than in the remedy, is the argument to which Judge Wells seems
to be replying. Of.course there is no want of mutuality in the obligations of the parties in these cases. Dresel v. Jordan is perhaps the
leading case in this country.
"See supra, note 29.

536

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

in England, a right to perfect his title at any time befor(

decree. 55
The case of Miller v. Cameron5 6 suggests a possible exception to the practice we have been discussing. It would
appear that in that case the plaintiff vendor had not signed
the contract of sale. In his bill he did not allege that he had
offered a good title. A demurrer was sustained on the
ground that in a case "where the complainant is not originally bound-that is, is not bound at all by the contract, and
cannot himself be brought into court, he should by all means
be required to show that he had most faithfully performed
every stipulation, on his part to be performed, so far as
they appear upon the record. ' 5 7 Irrespective of the correctness of applying these ideas to cases where only the defendant has signed, which is a question of the proper interpretation of the Statute of Frauds, it would appeal to the
writer that in the case of a contract containing an option to
sell, the option is not properly taken up unless the holder
offers a good title, and that therefore it would be, as indicated in the New Jersey case just cited, improper to permit
a vendor under such a contract to complete his title after
filing his bill.
In regard to the practice as a whole it mayzbe regarded as
proper, even though the confusion of titles to real property,
which was the original cause of the practice, 'does not exist
in this country to anything like the extent it did in England
in the eighteenth century. Of course the contract should be
free from objection, and the title, though not made out at the
time the bill is filed, should be made out within the time contemplated by the parties. The first proviso is, as we have
seen, expressly pointed out by the English courts, the second
by the American. Both, however, may be assumed to be
essential. Whether the ffrst criterion is satisfied where the
vendor at the time of the contract knew that he had no title
is apparently open to doubt onthis side of the Atlantic. - In
'There

are at least two cases in which the facts indicated appear:

Tison v. Smith, 8 Tex. 147, 1852; Reeves v. Dickey, to Grat. 138. Va.,

1853.

"45 N. J. Eq. 95, 1889.

- " Page 96.
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(England it would appear to be fatal to the plaintiff's bill.
This is a question of the policy of the law's recognition of a
certain class of contracts. It hasnothing to do with the specific performance of contracts. So also whether a contract is
completed within the time contemplated by the parties is a
question of the interpretation of contracts, and has likewise
nothing to do with specific performance. Though it has
been necessary to point out the tendencies of the decisions
on both these questions in order to show the present scope
of the practice of permitting a plaintiff to perfect his title
after bill filed, I have not discussed either. But assuming
that the original contract i.; a.proper one, and at the time
the court is called upon to dispose of the case the plaintiff
is able to fulfill his contract to the letter, there is certainly
no injustice to the defendant in making him fulfill his promises. For the court to undertake to investigate the extent of
the defects in the plaintiff's title at a prior time, or how far
these defects, if they existed, were known to the plaintiff,
would, under the circumstances, smack of an academic discussion rather than of an effort at the practical administration of justice.
William Draper Lewis.
U

